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The need for financial assistance in the euro zone
When entering the monetary union,member countries
lose their capacity to issue debt in a currency over
which they have full control.As a result, a loss of con-
fidence on the part of investors can drive the country
in a self-fulfilling way into default (Kopf 2011). The
reason why this happens can be described as follows.
Suppose that investors fear a default, by say, the
Spanish government. They sell Spanish government
bonds,raising the interest rate.The investors who have
acquired euros are likely to decide to invest these
euros elsewhere, in German government bonds, for
example.As a result,the euros leave the Spanish bank-
ing system.Thus the total amount of liquidity (money
supply) in Spain shrinks. The Spanish government
experiences a liquidity crisis,i.e.,it cannot obtain funds
to roll over its debt at reasonable interest rates.In addi-
tion,the Spanish government cannot force the Bank of
Spain to buy government debt. The ECB can provide
unlimited liquidity, but the Spanish government does
not control that institution.
This is not the case for countries
capable of issuing debt in their
own currency. Let’s trace what
would happen if investors were
to fear that the UK government
might be defaulting on its debt.
In that case,they would sell their
UK government bonds, driving
up the interest rate.After selling
these bonds, these investors
would have pounds that most
probably they would want to get
rid of by selling them in the for-
eign exchange market.The price of the pound would
drop until somebody else would be willing to buy
these pounds. The effect of this mechanism is that
the pounds would remain bottled up in the UK
money market to be invested in UK assets. Put dif-
ferently, the UK money stock would remain un-
changed.Part of that stock of money would probably
be re-invested in UK government securities.But even
if that were not the case and the UK government can-
not find the funds to roll over its debt at reasonable
interest rates, it would certainly force the Bank of
England to buy up the government securities. Thus
the UK government is ensured that liquidity is avail-
able to fund its debt. This means that investors can-
not precipitate a liquidity crisis in the UK that could
force the UK government into default. There is a
superior force of last resort, the Bank of England.
This different mechanism explains why the Spanish
government now pays 200 basis points more on its
ten-year bonds than the UK government despite the
fact that its debt and deficit are significantly lower
than the UK ones. This contrast is shown vividly in
Figures 1 and 2.
Because of the liquidity flows triggered by changing
market sentiments, member countries of a monetary
union become vulnerable to these market senti-
ments.These can lead to “sudden stops” in the fund-
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ing of the government debt (Calvo 1988), setting in
motion a devilish interaction between liquidity and
solvency crises. For the liquidity crisis raises the
interest rate, which in turn leads to a solvency crisis.
This problem is not unique for members of a mone-
tary union.It has been found to be very important in
emerging economies that cannot issue debt in their
own currencies. (See Eichengreen et al. 2005, who
have analyzed these problems in great detail).
There are important further implications of the
increased vulnerability of member countries of a
monetary union. (In De Grauwe 2011 these implica-
tions are developed in greater detail; see also Wolf
2011). One of these is that member countries of a
monetary union lose much of their capacity to apply
counter-cyclical budgetary policies. When, during a
recession,the budget deficits increase,the risk grows
of creating a loss of investors’ confidence in the ca-
pacity of the sovereign to service the debt. This has
the effect of raising the interest rate, making the re-
cession worse, and leading to even higher budget
deficits. As a result, countries in a monetary union
can be forced into a bad equilibrium, characterized
by deflation, high interest rates, high budget deficits
and a banking crisis (see De Grauwe 2011 for a more
formal analysis).
What kind of governance?
The previous discussion points towards the existence
of a coordination failure in the euro zone. Financial
markets can drive member countries into a bad equi-
librium that is the result of a self-fulfilling mecha-
nism.This coordination failure can
in principle be solved by collective
action aimed at steering countries
towards a good equilibrium.
In addition to this coordination
failure, there is another impor-
tant feature of the euro zone that
requires collective action. This is
that the euro zone creates exter-
nalities (mainly through conta-
gion).When one country is pushed
into a bad equilibrium, this af-
fects all the other countries main-
ly because of the intense degree
of financial integration. As a re-
sult, a default risk in one country
can lead to a default risk of sov-
ereigns and banks in other countries. As with all
externalities, government action must aim at inter-
nalizing these.
Collective action and internalization can be taken at
two levels. One is at the level of the central banks;
the other at the level of the government budgets.
Liquidity crises are avoided in stand-alone countries
that issue debt in their own currencies mainly
because the central bank can be forced to provide all
the necessary liquidity to the sovereign. This out-
come can also be achieved in a monetary union if the
common central bank is willing to buy the different
sovereigns’ debt. In fact this is what happened in the
euro zone during the debt crisis. The ECB bought
government bonds of distressed member countries,
either directly,or indirectly by the fact that it accept-
ed these bonds as collateral in its support of the
banks from the same distressed countries. In doing
so,the ECB rechanneled liquidity to countries hit by
a liquidity crisis,and prevented the centrifugal forces
created by financial markets from breaking up the
euro zone . It was the right policy for a central bank
whose “raison d’être” it is to preserve the monetary
union.Yet, the ECB has been severely criticized for
saving the euro zone this way. The main reason for
this criticism is that these liquidity provisions have
potential fiscal policy consequences. For example,
when, in order to rechannel liquidity to Greece and
Portugal, the ECB buys Greek and Portuguese gov-
ernment bonds, it exposes itself to the risk of future
losses. In doing so it commits euro zone taxpayers to
paying the bill in the future,without asking their per-
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Figure 2convince the ECB that it should not be involved in
such liquidity operations,and that instead the liquid-
ity support must be carried out by other institutions,
in particular a European Monetary Fund.I return to
this issue in the next section.
Collective action and internalization can also be tak-
en at the budgetary level. Ideally, a budgetary union
is the instrument of collective action and internaliza-
tion. By consolidating (centralizing) national gov-
ernment budgets into one central budget a mecha-
nism of automatic transfers can be organized.Such a
mechanism works as an insurance transferring re-
sources to the country hit by a negative economic
shock.In addition,such a consolidation creates a com-
mon fiscal authority that can issue debt in a currency
under the control of that authority.In so doing,it pro-
tects the member states from being forced into de-
fault by financial markets. It also protects the mone-
tary union from the centrifugal forces that financial
markets can exert on the union.
This solution of the systemic problem of the euro
zone requires a greater degree of political union.
Economists have stressed that such a political union
will be necessary to sustain the monetary union in
the long run (European Commission 1977 and De
Grauwe 1992). It is clear, however, that there is no
willingness in Europe today to significantly increase
the degree of political union. This unwillingness to
move towards a stronger political union will contin-
ue to make the euro zone a fragile construction. I
will not pursue this further here, but instead concen-
trate on the European Monetary Fund.
A European Monetary Fund
An important step was taken in May 2010 when the
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was
instituted. This facility will be transformed into a
permanent fund, the European Stabilization Mech-
anism (ESM), which will obtain funding from the
participating countries and will provide loans to
countries in need of liquidity assistance.This mech-
anism will make explicit the fiscal commitments of
every country. Thus, a European Monetary Fund
will be created, as was first proposed by Gros and
Mayer (2010).
Although an important step forwards, the EFSF
(and the future ESM) suffer from several problems
that undermine its effectiveness.
First, the EFSF (and the future ESM) are not au-
tonomous institutions in the way the IMF is. Each
country keeps its veto power for every new finan-
cial assistance program. This feature will make
these institutions very ineffective, as has already
been shown.With each demand for financial assis-
tance political bickering is set in.There will always
be a politician in some country (a true Finn? Or a
Dutch extreme right populist?) who dislikes the
idea of providing financial assistance and will force
its government to oppose a deal or to add condi-
tions. As a result, the credibility of the institution
will be undermined, as no one knows whether and
under what conditions the EFSF (ESM) will be
willing to provide credit.The only way to solve this
problem is to transform the EFSF (ESM) into a
true Monetary Fund in which decisions are taken
by a qualified majority, as is the case in other
European institutions (e.g., the Council of Minis-
ters). This, of course, implies that there be a will-
ingness to transfer sovereignty to the Monetary
Fund.
Second, the tendency of the EFSF has been to
impose too much austerity. There can be no doubt
that financial assistance can only be given provided
it is embedded in a program fiscal consolidation.
Thus conditionality is essential in financial assis-
tance, very much as this is the case in the framework
of the financial assistance provided by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. The problem up to now is
that the EFSF has imposed to overly harsh austerity
programs.This manifests itself in different ways.
Countries that apply for financing from the ESM are
countries that experience a recession or a negative
shock of another type. They will be subjected to a
tough budgetary austerity program as a condition for
obtaining finance. Thus, with each recession, when a
number of euro zone countries may be forced to turn
to the ESM they will be obliged to follow pro-cyclical
budgetary policies, i.e., to reduce spending and in-
crease taxes.A sure way to make the recession worse,
which in turn will make it very difficult to reduce bud-
get deficits and debt levels.
The anti-cyclicality of government budgets is an im-
portant achievement in the developed world. It has
led to greater business cycle stability and to greater
social welfare, shielding people from the harshness
of booms and busts in capitalist systems.The way the
ESM has been set up, however, risks undermining
this achievement.
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It is essential that the ESM take a more intelligent
approach to lending to distressed countries than the
EFSF has been doing up to now. The interest rate
applied by the EFSF in the Irish rescue program
amounts to almost 6 percent.This high interest rate
has a very unfortunate effect. First, by charging this
high interest rate it is more difficult for the Irish
government to reduce its budget deficit and to slow
down debt accumulation.Second,by charging a risk
premium of about 3 percent above the risk free rate
that the German, Dutch and Austrian governments
enjoy,the EFSF signals to the market that there is a
significant risk of default, and thus that the Irish
government may not succeed in putting its bud-
getary house in order. No wonder that financial
markets maintain their distrust and also charge a
high-risk premium. All this, in a self-fulfilling way,
increases the risk of default. It has to be added that
at the European Council meeting of 21 July 2011 it
was decided to lower the interest rate charged by
the EFSF.
The intelligent approach to financial assistance con-
sists in using a carrot-and-stick policy.The stick is the
conditionality, i.e., an austerity package spelled out
over a sufficiently long period of time,so that econo-
mic growth gets a chance.Without economic growth
debt burdens cannot decline.The carrot is a conces-
sional interest rate that makes it easier for the coun-
try concerned to stop debt accumulation. A low in-
terest rate also expresses trust in the success of the
package;trust that financial markets need in order to
induce them to buy the government debt at a rea-
sonable interest rate.
There are other features that will undermine the ca-
pacity of the future ESM to sta-
bilize the sovereign bond mar-
kets in the euro zone .From 2013
on, all members of the euro zone
will be obliged to introduce “col-
lective actions clauses”when they
issue new government bonds.The
practical implication of this is the
following. When in the future, a
government turns to the ESM to
obtain funding, private bondhold-
ers may be asked to share in the
restructuring of the debt. Put dif-
ferently, they may be asked to
take some of the losses.This may
seem to be a good decision.Bond-
holders will be forced to think
twice when they invest in government bonds, as these
bonds may not be as secure as they thought.
The intention may be good; the effect will be nega-
tive (De Grauwe 2010).In fact we have already seen
the effects.When the German government made the
first proposal to introduce collective action clauses
at the European Council meeting of October 2010,
the immediate effect was to intensify the crisis in the
euro zone sovereign bond markets. I show evidence
for this in Figure 3, which presents the government
bond spreads of a number of euro zone countries. It
can be seen that immediately after the European
Council meeting of 28–29 October, when the first
announcement was made to attach collective action
clauses (CACs) to future government bond issues,
the government bond spreads of Ireland, Portugal
and Spain shot up almost immediately. Since then
these spreads have remained high. This contrasts
with the previous European Council meetings,which
either did not seem to affect the spreads or as in the
case of the May 2010 meeting was followed by a
(temporary) decline in the spreads.
The reaction of the markets to the announcement of
future CACs should not have been surprising.When
private bondholders know that in the future their
bonds will lose value when a country turns to the
ESM,they will want to be compensated for the added
risk with a higher interest rate. In addition, and even
more importantly,each time they suspect that a coun-
try may turn to the ESM for funding they will imme-
diately sell their bonds,so as to avoid a potential loss.
But this selling activity raises the interest rate on
these bonds and makes it more likely that the gov-
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Figure 3Thus the collective action clauses will make the gov-
ernment bond markets more fragile and more sensi-
tive to speculative fears.I argued earlier that the sys-
temic problem of the euro zone lies in the fact that in
a monetary union the national governments are
more vulnerable to liquidity crises triggered by move-
ments in confidence in financial markets. Instead of
alleviating this problem the collective action clauses
will intensify it, because with each decline in confi-
dence bondholders will “run for cover”to avoid loss-
es, thereby triggering a crisis.
All this is quite unfortunate. Especially because the
existence of a financial support mechanism in the eu-
ro zone is a great idea and a significant step forwards
in the building of an integrated Europe (Peirce,
Micossi and Carmassi 2011).Unfortunately,by intro-
ducing all kinds of restrictions and conditions, the
ESM has been transformed into an institution that is
unlikely to produce more stability in the euro zone .
Conclusion
A monetary union can only function if there is a col-
lective mechanism of mutual support and control.
Such a collective mechanism exists in a political
union. In the absence of a political union, the mem-
ber countries of the euro zone are condemned to fill
in the necessary pieces of such a collective mecha-
nism.The debt crisis has made it possible to fill in a
few of these pieces. An example of this is the cre-
ation of the EFSF and the future ESM. These are
important steps forward. What has been achieved,
however, is still far from sufficient to guarantee the
survival of the euro zone.
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